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PLAIN VIEW REVISITED
Howard E. Wallin*
I. Introduction
The plain view exception, one of the more sophisticated doc-
trines in Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence,
allows for warrantless seizures under limited circumstances.'
In addition to various uncertainties left unresolved by the Su-
preme Court's initial decisions on the subject, several of the doc-
trine's elements proved, at times, difficult to apply practically,
engendering confusing and inadequate results. Over the past
several decades, much clarification has finally emerged. None-
theless, judicial analysis and decisions remain all too frequently
less than satisfactory. This piece is designed to supplement
earlier efforts on the subject 2 by reviewing the current status of
the plain view exception and examining critical, though ques-
tionable, decisions.
II. Coolidge v. New Hampshire
In the aftermath of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Su-
preme Court's seminal, though less than precise, opinion, most
courts agreed that a plain view seizure is permissible when the
following four conditions coalesce: (1) a prior justified intrusion;
(2) the item is found in plain view; (3) it is "immediately appar-
ent" that the find is in some fashion incriminating; and (4) the
discovery is "inadvertent."3 This article will focus on these four
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore Law School; LL.B. University of
Maryland Law School 1965. He also would like to express his appreciation to Mrs.
Martha Kahlert, a most patient and pleasant secretary, and to Ms. Kimberly E.
Lensing and Ms. Dana A. Russell, valuable research assistants.
1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
2. Howard E. Wallin, The Uncertain Scope of the Plain View Doctrine, 16 U.
BALT. L. REV. 266 (1987).
3. See Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Meyer, 827 F.2d 943 (3d
Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnston, 784 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1986); United States
v. Amuny, 767 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1985).
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elements with the discussion beginning with element (3), then
(4) and finally, a discussion of elements (1) and (2) together.
III. Immediately Apparent
During ensuing years, several of these requirements were
either eliminated or defined more precisely. For example, in Ar-
izona v. Hicks4 the somewhat ambiguous "immediately appar-
ent" standard was finally authoritatively defined as nothing
more than the familiar probable cause criterion. 5 Judicial deci-
sions interpreting that phrase as implying the need for some
incremental element of certainty are, of course, no longer valid.
In addition to clarifying the immediately apparent element,
Hicks, as indicated herein, addresses several plain view issues
that lower courts either had not considered or had resolved
differently.
A. Supreme Court - Arizona v. Hicks
In Hicks, a police squad responded to a shooting where a
person was struck by a bullet fired through the floor of an
apartment above that of the victim. 6 Upon entering the
shooter's apartment, police found and seized several weapons
and a stocking-cap mask.7 One officer noticed two sets of expen-
sive stereo components, which appeared out of place in the
rather shabby apartment.8 Suspecting that they were stolen,
the officer moved the components in order to read and copy the
serial numbers.9 Upon reporting the numbers to his headquar-
ters, he was told that several of the items were stolen. 10 One
piece of equipment, a Bang and Olufsen turntable, was taken
immediately and the others were eventually seized pursuant to
a valid warrant."
All of the lower courts and, eventually, the Supreme Court
agreed that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent cir-
4. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
5. Id. at 326-27.
6. Id. at 323.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 323-24.
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cumstances. 12 They disagreed, however, over whether the sub-
sequent police actions were valid.13
Initially agreeing with the State, the Supreme Court unani-
mously ruled that a mere recording of the equipments' serial
numbers would not implicate the Fourth Amendment because it
was neither a search nor a seizure. 14 The majority did find,
however, that the moving of the Bang and Olufsen for the pur-
pose of examining its serial number did constitute a search.' 5
Being a warrantless search, that movement would be valid only
if it fell within some exception to the warrant requirement. 6
The majority rejected the notion that the plain view doctrine
condoned this warrantless movement because the State had not
shown all of its four requisite elements; proof that the incrimi-
nating nature (the serial number) of the turntable immediately
was apparent was lacking.' 7 "Immediately apparent," the Court
explained, means only probable cause.' 8 Since the State had
conceded that the police officer prior to his action did not have
probable cause that the turntable was stolen, the plain view ex-
ception to the warrant requirement was unavailable. 19 None-
theless, the State argued that the investigating officer's
"reasonable suspicion," albeit not probable cause, justified
movement of the turntable under plain view.20 The majority re-
jected that argument. 21 It reasoned that movement of the turn-
table would be valid under plain view only if it could be seized
under plain view.22 Seizure, in turn, would be permissible only
with probable cause.23 Given the State's concession that the of-
ficer had no probable cause, the majority concluded that the
plain view exception was inapplicable. 24
12. Id. at 324.
13. Id.
14. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324.
15. Id. at 324-25.
16. Id. at 326-27.
17. Id. at 328.
18. Id. at 326.
19. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326.
20. Id.
21. Id at 326-28.
22. Id. at 328.
23. Id.
24. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327-28.
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While the dissenters agreed that probable cause, synony-
mous with immediately apparent, is required under plain
view,25 it held that with reasonably, articulable suspicion, police
have a right to make a cursory examination of such suspicious
items as part of their investigation.26 A host of federal and state
court decisions permitting movement for a better view of sus-
pect objects based solely on articulable suspicion are cited.27
Presumably, under the majority's view those cases are no longer
valid.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued, "[elven if
probable cause were the appropriate standard,.., it was satis-
fied here."28 She explained as follows:
When police officers, during the course of a search inquiring into
grievously unlawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-
off rifle and a stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment
two sets of stereo equipment that are both inordinately expensive
in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored targets
of larcenous activity, . . . probable cause has been satisfied.29
What is puzzling about that dissenting opinion is the state-
ment that "probable cause has been satisfied"30 when, in fact,
the officer had only reasonable suspicion and not probable
cause, as the State had conceded. 31 Apparently, in Justice
O'Connor's view, the probable cause standard is not the investi-
gating officer's subjective state of mind, but what a reasonable
police officer would have concluded. If the court determines
that objectively probable cause was present, the immediately
apparent requirement has been met regardless of the State's
concession otherwise. The majority clearly rejected that posi-
25. Id. at 333-36.
26. Id. at 326-27.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 399 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379,
381 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257-58 n.8 (2d Cir.
1979); People v. Dorris, 442 N.E.2d 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v. Eddington,
178 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. Ct. App.1970), rev'd on other grounds, 198 N.W.2d 297
(Mich. 1972); State v. Rieginger, 374 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1985); State v. Proctor, 529
P.2d 472 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Noll, 343 N.W.2d 391 (Wis. 1984).
28. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 339 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 326.
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tion, for it stated that, in light of the State's concession, the
Court was precluded from considering whether the probable
cause standard had been satisfied.32
B. State Courts
1. State v. Eady
Despite the majority, a fairly recent Connecticut case ap-
pears to endorse Justice O'Connor's position. In State v. Eady,33
volunteer firefighters responded to a residential fire. After ex-
tinguishing the blaze, a team entered the house for ventilation
purposes and to search for possible victims. 34 In the process,
Fire Captain Angel L. Marrero, a member of the team, discov-
ered a locked door.35 He forced open the door leading to the
owner's bedroom, but no victims were found. 36 Marrero opened
a window to further ventilate the premises.37 At that point, he
observed two cigar boxes on a dresser, one of which was open. It
contained a clear plastic bag with a small quantity of green
leafy substance.38 That information was conveyed to the fire
chief in charge and then to a police officer, Sgt. Thomas Lepore,
who was directing traffic.39 Lepore entered and recognized the
leafy substance as marijuana. 40 In addition to the marijuana,
other illegal substances and miscellaneous incriminating evi-
dence found in the cigar box were seized without a warrant.41
The homeowner, Patrick Eady, was eventually convicted of drug
possession. He claimed that all of the incriminating evidence
was illegally seized due to the lack of a warrant. The State's
response was that the police action was justified under the
plain view doctrine. 42 While clearly the exigency justified an in-
trusion, defendant nonetheless argued that the "immediately
apparent" or "probable cause" requirement had not been satis-
32. Id.
33. 733 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1999).
34. Id. at 115.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Eady, 733 A.2d at 115.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 115.
42. Id. at 115-16.
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fled because Marrero testified at the suppression hearing that
he was uncertain whether the leafy substance was marijuana.43
The majority found that despite his personal uncertainty, most
reasonable persons in Marrero's position would have believed
that it was, in fact, marijuana. 44 On that basis, in the court's
43. Eady, 733 A.2d at 119 n.10.
44. In this issue of first impression in Connecticut, its highest appellate court
held in Eady that there is no Fourth Amendment violation when an initial exigent
entry by firefighters who observe contraband in plain view is followed by a subse-
quent entry and seizure of the contraband by police. In so holding, it relied on the
majority of courts that have permitted police to step into the shoes of firefighters to
seize contraband without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 121; see, e.g., People v.
Reynolds, 672 P.2d 529, 531 (Colo. 1983); State v. Johnson, 413 A.2d 931, 934 (Me.
1980); Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 568-74 (Miss. 1982); State v. Jolley, 321
S.E.2d 883, 886-87 (N.C. 1984); La Fournier v. State, 280 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1979);
State v. Anderson, 599 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Or. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Eacret, 595
P.2d 490 (Or. Ct. App. 1979). For example, in United States v. Green, 474 F.2d
1385 (5th Cir. 1973), the court held that:
[o]nce the privacy of a dwelling has been lawfully invaded, to require a sec-
ond officer from another law enforcement agency arriving on the scene of a
valid seizure to secure a warrant before he enters the premise to confirm
that the seized evidence is contraband and to take custody of it is just as
senseless as requiring an officer to interrupt a lawful search to stop and
procure a warrant for evidence he has already inadvertently found and
seized.
Id. at 1390.
The Eady court applied the rule it had adopted earlier in State v. Magnano,
which involved an initial entry by a patrol officer, observation of contraband in
plain view and a subsequent entry by a detective. State v. Magnano, 528 A.2d 760
(Conn. 1987). There the Magnano court held that
when a law enforcement officer enters private premises in response to a call
for help, and during the course of responding to the emergency observes but
does not take into custody evidence in plain view, a subsequent entry
shortly thereafter, by detectives whose duty it is to process evidence, consti-
tutes a mere continuation of the original entry.
Id. at 764.
In reaching the decision that subsequent entry is a continuation of the original
entry, the court in Magnano concluded that the continuation doctrine is perfectly
consistent with the rationale and purpose of the plain view doctrine. In addition,
Magnano observed that the defendant has little to complain about concerning the
entry by the subsequent officers because under Illinois v. Andreas, the Supreme
Court of the United States stated that "the plain view doctrine is grounded on the
proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand,
its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents
of title and possession but not the privacy." Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772
(1983); see also Magnano, 528 A.2d at 66.
The Eady court held that, "[flor purposes of plain view doctrine analysis ...
there is no meaningful distinction between the two scenarios" even though in Eady
the initial entry was that of a firefighter, whereas Magnano, the decision on which
312
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view, the immediately apparent element was satisfied.45
The dissent, found that the "immediately apparent" ele-
ment of the plain view exception simply was not existent here. 46
For plain view to apply, police must have subjective probable
cause that what they are viewing and taking is incriminating.47
Since Marrero himself did not have probable cause that the
leafy substance was marijuana he had absolutely no authority
to seize it. 48 The dissent characterized the majority analysis as
this: "[aiccording to the majority, in other words, the fact that
an officer does not believe that he has probable cause (and,
therefore, believes that he is violating the Constitution) will not
invalidate a seizure if the reviewing court determines that a hy-
pothetical "reasonable officer" would have had probable
cause."
49
That approach, the dissent explained, is contrary to the
Hicks majority, which held that "immediately apparent" or
"probable cause" could be satisfied only if Marrero had subjec-
tively believed, which he did not, that the leafy substance was
marijuana and that belief was a reasonable one. 50 In effect, the
dissent argued, the Eady majority was following O'Connor's po-
sition, rejected in Hicks. 51
the Eady court relied, involved two successive entries by law enforcement agents.
Eady, 733 A.2d at 120. In Eady, the police entry eliminated the defendant's expec-
tation of privacy in the same way that the defendant's privacy was frustrated by
the lawful invasion of a firefighter in Magnano. Given a lawful entry, a firefighter,
like a police officer, may seize incriminating evidence in plain view. Eady con-
cludes, therefore, that so long as the original entry was that of a governmental
agent, law enforcement authorities may properly follow it. Id. at 123.
Eady bolsters its decision with the common sense argument that there can be
no useful or beneficial purpose served by excluding plain view evidence seized by a
police officer who has stepped into the shoes of a firefighter because suppression
would not encourage police to obtain warrants. Id. at 121. On the contrary, it
could have an opposite effect by encouraging them to direct fire officials to seize
the evidence themselves, thereby creating problems in the accumulation of evi-
dence by inexperienced personnel.
45. Id. at 119.
46. Eady, 733 A.2d at 135 (Berdon, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 125.
48. Id. at 124-25.
49. Id. at 126.
50. Id. at 128 nn.4 & 22.
51. Eady, 733 A.2d at 133.
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2. State v. Olah
In State v. Olah,52 a case decided several months after
Eady, Connecticut's intermediate appellate court appears to
base its decision squarely on the Eady majority's rationale.
While ostensibly contrary to the Eady dissent, 53 it well may be
that even the Olah court would concur in the Eady holding.
Olah was suspected of having violated several statutes
dealing with offenses against minors and related sex crimes.
After a comprehensive investigation, Detective Benjamin
Trabka obtained a warrant to search Olah's bedroom for various
sexually explicit photographs and related items. 54 The trial
court ruled that some of the photographs and other evidence
taken did not fall within the warrant's command.55 Nonethe-
less, Trabka's action was deemed justified under plain view.56
To the defendant's claim that the doctrine was unavailable here
because the probable cause element was missing since Trabka
subjectively believed he was seizing the evidence pursuant to
the warrant, the court responded:
In discussing the "immediately apparent" aspect of the plain view
doctrine and its implicit probable cause requirement, the Su-
preme Court has stated that "[wihether a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation has occurred turns on an objective assessment of the
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
him at the time ... and not on the officer's actual state of mind at
the time the challenged action was taken. . . ." Trabka's subjec-
tive belief that he was acting pursuant to the command of the
warrant is, therefore, irrelevant. 57
The premise that immediately apparent or probable cause
depends on an objective assessment was the majority's opinion
in Eady. Despite the Eady dissent's criticism of that position
and insistence that probable cause be that of the seizing of-
ficer,58 Olah may be reconciled with the Eady dissent. In Eady,
52. 759 A.2d 548 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
53. There is no reference in Olah to the earlier conflict in Eady.
54. Olah, 759 A.2d at 551.
55. Id. at 550.
56. Id. at 553.
57. Id. (quoting State v. Eady, 733 A.2d 112, 118 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
58. Eady, 733 A.2d at 134-36; see also discussion supra note 41 and accompa-
nying text.
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because the firefighters had no probable cause that the leafy
substance was marijuana they knew of no justification for its
seizure.59 They did not harbor a belief that they had a legal
right to seize the leafy substance. 60 Olah is different. In relying
on the warrant, Trabka did not make an assessment of probable
cause.61 By the same token, since he was relying on the war-
rant, he believed that the evidence he took was legally seiza-
ble.62 Thus, the crucial differentiation between the two cases is
whether the officer subjectively believed that he was acting
properly.
C. Plain View Doctrine
1. Minnesota v. Dickerson
While the prior cases dealt primarily with clarifying plain
view principles either promulgated or touched upon originally
in Coolidge, Minnesota v. Dickerson63 introduced a novel, re-
lated warrantless intrusion characterized as plain feel. The
Coolidge case involved a frisk for weapons pursuant to the
guidelines of Terry v. Ohio.64 In Terry, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that if a police officer feels non-threatening but incrimi-
nating evidence, while patting down the suspect for weapons,
such evidence is seizable. 65
In Dickerson, police subjected the defendant to a conven-
tional stop and frisk in an urban area notorious for drug traf-
fic. 66 At the trial and appellate levels, the state courts
unanimously agreed that both the subject's demeanor and the
setting gave police requisite reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot and that the party was armed and danger-
ous. 67 Thus, under Terry and its progeny, Dickerson's brief de-
tention and the frisk on the outside of his person were lawful -
findings that eventually were not challenged before the Su-
preme Court. Although the investigating officer uncovered no
59. Id. at 135.
60. Id.
61. Olah, 759 A.2d at 553.
62. Id.
63. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
64. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
65. See id. at 27-30.
66. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 368-69.
67. Id. at 370.
2002] 315
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weapons during the pat-down, he detected a suspicious lump,
which "felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane." 68 In-
deed, the defendant had one-fifth of one gram of crack cocaine
in a small plastic bag in his front pocket, providing the critical
evidence in a conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. 69
The Minnesota courts considered whether such contraband
discovered by a sense of touch during a permissible pat-down
was admissible into evidence. 70 The Minnesota Supreme Court
suppressed the evidence. 71 Rejecting the argument that the of-
ficer's warrantless activities were no different than a typical
plain view invasion, it reasoned that suspicion developed by
way of touch is quite different. 72 First, "the sense of touch is
inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of
sight; '73 second, touch implicates a more serious adverse effect
on personal dignity.74 In the Minnesota Supreme Court's view,
neither consideration justified a blanket refusal to recognize the
analogy between plain view and plain feel. 75
Often, touch may not be as revealing or reliable as sight,
but as far back as Terry the Court acknowledged an officer's dis-
cretion during an ordinary frisk when the suspect is carrying a
weapon. 76 So, where that very same sense encounters what the
officer believes is contraband, that conclusion should be equally
trustworthy.77 Furthermore, even if touch per se is more offen-
sive than sight, the detainee, already being frisked for weapons,
is not subjected to some additional personal indignity by the of-
ficer's feel for what may be contraband. 78 "Accordingly," the
Court concluded, "the suspect's privacy interests are not ad-
68. Id. at 369 (quoting transcript of the record at 9, State v. Dickerson, 469
N.W.2d 462 (Minn. App. 1991)).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 369-71.
71. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 370-71.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 370 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 376-77.
76. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 377-79.
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vanced by a categorical rule barring the seizure of contraband
plainly detected through the sense of touch."79
Despite the recognition of a plain feel doctrine, the Court
agreed that suppression of the contraband incriminating Dick-
erson was warranted. 0 In effect, it held that the immediately
apparent element had not been satisfied. As developed in Min-
nesota's courts, the facts indicated that the wary officer did not
immediately identify the suspicious lump as crack cocaine. 8' It
was only after "squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating
the contents of the defendant's pocket," which clearly harbored
no weapon, that the lump was identified as an illegal sub-
stance.8 2 Had he made that very same determination in the
course of his initial pat-down, plain touch would have justified
extraction and seizure. 3 However, once a limited weapons
search is complete, further or more intense exploration no
longer bearing any relationship to the object of the initial recog-
nized warrantless intrusion is reminiscent of the abhorrent gen-
eral warrant and wholly unacceptable.8 4
Support for the majority analysis in Dickerson may be
found in Arizona v. Hicks.8 5 Like the detection of a less than
innocent item occurred in the wake of a legitimate justified in-
trusion on the suspect's premises in Hicks, investigating police
in Dickerson, during an analogous acceptable exception to the
warrant requirement, encountered what could conceivably con-
stitute an illegal substance.8 6 In both instances, however, that
suspicion could neither be confirmed nor dispelled without a
further warrantless invasion of the defendant's privacy inter-
ests. Just as the Hicks Court found that moving an object for
closer scrutiny without either the authority of a warrant or
some recognized warrantless exception was unconstitutional,8 7
the Dickerson Court also analogized that a more intense war-
79. Id. at 377.
80. Id. at 379.
81. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 379.
82. Id. at 378 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 378-79.
85. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). See supra notes 4-29 and accompanying text.
86. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 369.
87. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326-27.
2002]
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rantless and exploratory frisk was equally as offensive.88 In ei-
ther event, the incremental search was simply unjustified.
An issue raised by Dickerson is the precise nature of the
requisite immediately apparent element. By illustration, a
problem arises when the investigating officer conducting a legit-
imate Terry frisk perceives no weapon, feels no actual contra-
band, but from what is felt concludes that the item he is
touching contains contraband.8 9 In Stevenson, after being law-
fully stopped, police officers conducted a pat-down search of the
defendant based on reasonable suspicion. 90 The officer felt
three hard packages of folded paper or cardboard in the defen-
dant's pants and subsequently testified that he knew or be-
lieved that the packages contained cocaine. 91 Upon retrieval, it
was determined that the packages did, in fact, contain co-
caine.9 2 Although there was nothing about the feel of the pack-
ages that indicated its contents, the officer made his conclusion
based on the fact that, on previous occasions, he had seen co-
caine packaged in that fashion.93
2. In re Stevenson/R.A.
In Stevenson /R.A., again after a lawful stop followed by the
frisk of R.A., a minor, a Pennsylvania trooper felt what ap-
peared to be a cigarette or a cigar as well as an object similar to
a pill bottle in the lining of his jacket.94 The trooper testified
that he believed that R.A. was carrying contraband because he
was experienced in drug enforcement and had previously en-
countered instances in which narcotics were concealed in pill
bottles and cigars. 95 Upon removal and visual inspection, it was
determined that the cigar was in fact hollowed out and con-
tained marijuana and the pill bottle, which had a pop off lid,
88. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378-79.
89. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stevenson/R.A., 744 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2000) (a
consolidated appeal where appellants Reuben Stevenson and R.A., a minor, con-
tended that the Superior Court improperly upheld the trial court's denial of their
motions to suppress physical evidence obtained pursuant to a stop and frisk).
90. Id. at 1263.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1268.
94. Stevenson/R.A., 744 A.2d at 1264.
95. Id.
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contained crack cocaine. 96 Notwithstanding the trooper's belief
that R.A. was carrying contraband, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania concluded that suppression was in order because the
trooper did not "plainly feel" the drugs.9 7 Since in both in-
stances the officers did not actually physically perceive contra-
band, their actions did not fall within the Dickerson plain feel
rule.
3. Commonwealth v. Zhahir
Unfortunately, a few months after Stevenson/R.A. the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to have taken a contrary
position in Commonwealth v. Zhahir.9 There, based on infor-
mation from an unknown source, two officers initiated a surveil-
lance of Zhahir. 99 Although no drugs were seen, Zhahir's
actions were consistent with that of one trafficking narcotics.
He was approached by the two officers and the ensuing scene
was described thusly:
Officer Singletary got out of the vehicle and approached Zhahir,
who turned to face the officer with his left hand in his jacket
pocket. Officer Singletary asked Zhahir what was in his pocket,
immediately grabbed Zhahir's left hand and pocket at the same
time, and "felt what formed the consistency of a bundle of caps"
(vials of cocaine). Officer Singletary then seized a plastic bag
from Zhahir's jacket pocket, which contained 98 vials of crack co-
caine, the total weight of which was 3.70 grams. 100
The lower court held that police officers properly seized the con-
traband under the plain feel doctrine as it occurred during a
legitimate frisk for weapons. 1°1 Based on Officer Singletary's
professional experiences, he could reasonably conclude that
what he was feeling contained contraband. 10 2 Citing Steven-
son/R.A. in support of its conclusion, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court agreed. 10 3
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1268.
98. 751 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2000).
99. Id. at 1155-56.
100. Id. at 1156.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1163.
20021 319
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A dissenting jurist, citing Stevenson/R.A. as well, dis-
agreed and held that plain feel was wholly inapposite.10 4 He
could find no distinction between the facts in Zhahir and those
in Stevenson /R.A. 105 In none of the cases was contraband actu-
ally detected by the officers' sense of touch.10 6 They felt only
material that could be used for packaging controlled
substances.107
The dissent's point is well taken, for ostensibly all three
cases appear to be similar. However, while the majority does
not directly address the dissent's serious concerns, it does make
the following observation:
In the present case, police were responding to a tip involving nar-
cotics and observed behavior corroborative of the tip's allegation.
Furthermore, the frisk occurred in an area noted for drug activity
and the officer felt what he immediately perceived as numerous
(98) vials of cocaine, which was consistent with cocaine packaging
he had encountered in previous narcotics cases. Significantly,
given the number and nature of the containers, their presence
was not equally consistent with legitimate purposes. 08
Thus, the majority views the background in Zhahir as being dif-
ferent from Stevenson/R.A. in several different ways. Unlike
the latter two cases, here the suspect's personal activities as
well as where the activity transpired were indicative of drug-
dealing.109 Moreover, what the officer encountered was not one
or two suspicious objects, but numerous items indicating drug
possession. 110 It may well be that these two factual differences
provide the Pennsylvania court with a basis for its legal
conclusion.
IV. Inadvertence
A. Horton v. California
In addition to Hicks, which definitively clarified the imme-
diately apparent element of the plain view doctrine as contem-
104. Id. at 1164-66 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1164.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1163.
109. Id. at 1157.
110. Id. at 1156.
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plated by Coolidge, there is Horton v. California,111 which dealt
with perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Coolidge opin-
ion, i.e., inadvertence. In the aftermath of Coolidge, three dif-
ferent approaches to that subject had been developed. One line
of cases took the position that inadvertence was never an indis-
pensable requirement of plain view because it was demanded by
only a plurality of the Coolidge Court. 112
All other courts read Coolidge requiring inadvertence as
binding precedent. 1 3 In most jurisdictions where there was
probable cause to believe certain evidence would be found, the
discovery was held not to be inadvertent. 1 4 Inasmuch as a war-
rant could have been obtained those courts found plain view un-
available. Another tack was that probable cause was not
enough to invalidate a plain view seizure. Even in situations
where a warrant could have been obtained, the find was deemed
inadvertent if the law enforcement authorities acted innocently
and the procedure was not a mere subterfuge. 115 Sometimes it
is difficult to discern which of the latter two positions a particu-
lar jurisdiction endorses. 116
111. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
112. See North v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308-09
(Cal. 1972); State v. Poutier, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (Idaho 1974); State v. King, 191
N.W.2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971); State v. Mitchell, 266 S.E.2d 605, 609 (N.C. 1980).
The Supreme Court of Iowa in King mistakenly refers to the Coolidge plurality as
a "minority" opinion. King, 191 N.W.2d at 655.
113. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 3.4(K). See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 737 (1983); United States v. Liberti, 616 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1980); see
also Horton, 496 U.S. at 145, App. A at 149-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979); State v. How-
ard, 448 So. 2d 713, 718 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Cefalo, 409 N.E.2d
719, 724 n.6 (Mass. 1980); Commonwealth v. Casuccio, 454 A.2d 621, 630-31 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982). One jurist has aptly observed in these "traditional roles on the
issue of probable cause" are oddly reversed because the defendant will urge and
the state disclaim the presence of probable cause. Liberti, 616 F.2d at 38.
115. See United States v. Johnson, 707 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Wright, 641 F.2d 602, 605-06 (8th Cir. 1981); State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d
744, 746 (Iowa 1983). This interpretation of inadvertency appears designed to pre-
vent police from obtaining a warrant "in bad faith" or using plain view to "evade
the warrant requirement." See Johnson, 707 F.2d at 321; Wright, 641 F.2d at 605-
06; Oliver, 341 N.W.2d at 746.
116. In analyzing, for example, a host of plain view decisions rendered in Ma-
ryland, despite the fact that Maryland appears to endorse the position that inad-
vertency hinges on whether there was probable cause, Wiggins v. State, 554 A.2d
356, 365 (Md. 1989), this writer has detected both confusion and inconsistency.
See Wallin, supra, note 1, at 282-85.
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In a sense, Horton v. California117 resolved the issue by
eliminating the inadvertency element. There, in an armed rob-
bery masked men took jewelry and cash.118 Somehow the victim
was able to detect the distinctive nature of the suspect Horton's
voice and eventually police, after further investigation, applied
for a search and seizure warrant.119 Although the affidavit
made reference to the specific weapons used, the perpetrators'
clothing and all of the ill-gained proceeds, the warrant listed
only three distinctive rings of the victim. 120 This stolen prop-
erty was never discovered, but other stolen items and the weap-
ons employed were observed in plain view and seized.' 2'
Defendant argued that given the recital in the affidavit, the
finds were clearly anticipated, making their seizure unlawful. 122
A majority of the Court disagreed. 123 After exploring the
questionable precedential effect of the Coolidge discussion re-
lated to inadvertence, 124 the Court concluded that heretofore it
will no longer be a necessary factor for a plain view seizure. As
a practical matter, the Court reasoned, investigating officers
have no incentive for deliberately omitting an item they might
or expect to find. 25 In terms of privacy interests, even in the
absence of inadvertency, the scope of a warrant is already lim-
ited by the Fourth Amendment's insistence on particularity
with respect to "the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized." 26 Similarly, the bounds of warrantless in-
vasions are defined by the exigencies justifying the intrusion.
Thus, apprehension over the prospect of general-type warrants
in no way justifies the demand for inadvertency for
"[s]crupulous adherence to [those] requirements serves the in-
terests in limiting the area and duration of the search that the
117. 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
118. Id. at 130-31.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Horton, 496 U.S. at 131.
123. Id. at 138-41.
124. Id. at 134-37.
125. Id. at 138 n.9 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 577
(1971) (White, J., concurring and dissenting)).
126. Id. at 139 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Steel v.
United States No. 1, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
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inadvertence requirement inadequately protects. "127 Inadver-
tency in the Court's view is simply superfluous. 128
In a real sense, Horton is a boon to investigating officers.
Each and every item they anticipate, or have probable cause to
suspect will be revealed by a warrant, no longer needs to be
enumerated therein. Their expectations are not a considera-
tion. By the same token, it should not encourage less than
thoughtful draftsmanship. As the Horton Court notes, had the
rings, the only pieces of evidence listed in the warrant, been
seized as soon as they entered Horton's home, the authority to
search any further would have immediately ceased. 29 Investi-
gators would thereafter be in no position to accumulate other
fruits of the crime such as the weapons used. Similarly, had the
warrant listed only the cumbersome weapons such as the ma-
chine gun or the stunning device, the search team would have
been foreclosed from rummaging in places like furniture draw-
ers, relatively small containers or pockets of clothing that could
not conceivably hide that evidence. Hence, the opportunity to
detect such fruits of the crime such as the small rings would
have been lost even under the plain view exception. Clearly,
the greater and more diverse the scope of a warrant, the greater
the advantage for law enforcement officers.
In addition, the teachings of Hicks,130 dealing on its face
only with the conduct of a search, should not be overlooked by
applicants for a warrant. By way of illustration, suppose police
officers come across items like a radio, recorder, or camera in
the course of serving a warrant. If the serial numbers on these
items are not visible and the police have merely a slight suspi-
cion that they may be stolen, Hicks prevents them from being
moved for further inspection. If the warrant lists only evidence
that, owing to its configuration could not be concealed either in-
side, under, or behind the suspicious object, investigators would
have no legal basis for allaying or confirming their suspicion.
On the other hand, if the warrant is sufficiently broad and/or
detailed, it would authorize official handling of the find in order
to seek the subjects enumerated therein. Therefore, the lifting
127. Horton, 496 U.S. at 140.
128. Id. at 140-41.
129. Id. at 141.
130. See supra notes 4-29 and accompanying text.
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or moving of such items would then reveal the critical identify-
ing numbers, which may be recorded even without resorting to
plain view. In any event, both Hicks and Horton should en-
courage the artful drafting of search and seizure warrants.
V. Prior Justification
While dealing with other significant aspects of the plain
view doctrine, none of the three major decisions reviewed and
analyzed herein discusses the prior justification requirement.
It is however precisely this particular aspect of plain view that
has consistently been either misunderstood or misapplied by
courts generally. As explained in Coolidge, prior justification
may come in several forms. The justification for entry may be
pursuant to consent, a warrant or based on some recognized ex-
ception to the warrant requirement such as hot pursuit or
search incident to arrest.' 3 '
A. Open v. Plain View
Appreciation of the prior justification element necessitates
a clear understanding of the analytical framework for the plain
view exception. Judge Moylan points out that:
[t]he hardest conceptual problem attending the plain view doc-
trine is to grasp that it is not a universal statement of the right of
a policeman to seize after seeing something in open view; it is
rather a limited statement of the right in one of several instances
- following a valid intrusion 32
1. Open View
Judge Moylan then identifies two types of observations that
are not covered by the plain view doctrine. 3 3 The first is a situ-
ation where the police see items where privacy is not protected
by the Constitution. So, for example, items on a public street or
in an open field are seizable not by virtue of the plain view doc-
trine, but because they are not protected by the Fourth Amend-
131. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66.
132. Charles E. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the
Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1096 (1975).
133. Id. at 1097.
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ment. 3 4 A second scenario is that of police officers standing
outside a constitutionally-protected location observing items
within that protected area. While they may employ the infor-
mation they have garnered through their observation, for exam-
ple in seeking a warrant, the view in and of itself does not
justify an intrusion into the protected area. 135 Simply because
they have seen an item that they have a legitimate right to ob-
serve does not justify a warrantless intrusion into an otherwise
constitutionally-protected area. Such observations are, there-
fore, characterized by courts as open view, but not plain view. 136
2. Plain View
Plain view, on the other hand, deals only with those cir-
cumstances where an officer has already justifiably intruded
into a constitutionally-protected area, spots and then removes
incriminating evidence. It refers only to seizures but not to
searches. In explaining that plain view is a recognized justifica-
tion for warrantless seizures, not warrantless searches, the Su-
preme Court in Horton made the following observations:
The right to security in person and property protected by the
Fourth Amendment may be invaded in quite different ways by
searches and seizures. A search compromises the individual in-
terest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion
over his or her person or property. The "plain view" doctrine is
often considered an exception to the general rule that warrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this characteriza-
tion overlooks the important difference between searches and
seizures. If an article is already in plain view, neither its observa-
tion nor its seizure would involve any invasion of privacy. A
seizure of the article, however, would obviously invade the
owner's possessory interest. If "plain view" justifies an exception
from an otherwise applicable warrant requirement, therefore, it
must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that are
implicated by seizures rather than by searches. 137
Hence, unlike other warrantless exceptions, plain view is not an
"independent exception" to the warrant requirement. Rather,
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1100.
136. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 859 P.2d 344, 349 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Brown
v. State, 292 A.2d 762, 778 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
137. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1990) (citations omitted).
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the doctrine is better understood as an extension of the officer's
prior justification for access to the object because plain view
merely provides grounds for the seizure of the item in question.
A typical example of a plain view seizure is the situation where
police have a warrant to search for some article in a given loca-
tion and, in the course of that search, run across some other
object of incriminating nature. That article is seizable under
plain view. Moreover, the initial intrusion need not necessarily
be by way of a warrant. Even if the article comes into plain
view as a result of some recognized exception to the warrant
requirement, the seizure may likewise be valid. Thus, if for ex-
ample police are searching a vehicle under the Carroll doc-
trine138 based on probable cause to believe that it contains a
weapon, and in the course of that search discover contraband, it
is seizable under plain view.
a. Coolidge v. New Hampshire
Evidence coming into view during a search incident to ar-
rest or during the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect also may be
seized under the plain view doctrine. Based on those cases, Jus-
tice Stewart in Coolidge articulates the following proposition:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came. . . across a piece of evidence incrimi-
nating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pur-
suit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure. 139
Since the doctrine only supplements a prior justified inva-
sion, it does not in and of itself legitimize an intrusion. What
usually takes place, therefore, is the observation of incriminat-
ing evidence after police have already lawfully entered a consti-
tutionally-protected environment. However, that may not
always be the case.
138. The Carroll doctrine states that "a reasonable search may be made of a
vehicle which is easily and quickly movable, without a warrant and in the absence
of a prior arrest, so long as there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains contraband." United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 1969).
139. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
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b. Washingtom v. Chrisman
Washington v. Chrisman140 provides an excellent illustra-
tion of a plain view observation occurring before a valid intru-
sion. There, a student was arrested for illegal possession of
alcohol on a university campus.' 4 ' Accompanied by the arrest-
ing officer, the student returned to his dormitory room to obtain
proof of identity, while the officer waited outside. 142 Standing in
the doorway, he peered into the interior of the room and saw
what he believed to be marijuana seeds and a marijuana pipe
on a desk inside the room.' 43 He immediately entered the room,
confirmed that his perception had been accurate and arrested
the student for the drug violations.144 The Supreme Court of
Washington found that this warrantless entry and the subse-
quent seizures were illegal. 45
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed
and validated the initial seizure of the marijuana seeds and the
pipe under the plain view doctrine. 146 The defendant had
claimed that the doctrine was inapposite because the officer's
initial observations were not made after a legitimate intrusion
into the dormitory room, but instead took place from outside the
room.' 47 Therefore, he argued, plain view could not justify ei-
ther entry or seizure of the incriminating items. 48 A majority
of the Supreme Court, rejecting the argument, responded that
regardless of the officer's position, he had a legal right to enter
the room whenever he considered it essential. 149 Authority to
enter the room did not cease simply because the officer had cho-
140. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
141. In the recital of the facts it appears the officer "stopped" Chrisman's
roommate. Id. at 3. However, the opinion later states that the roommate was
"under lawful arrest." Id. at 6. Earlier, the Supreme Court of Washington had
approved the trial court's determination that the defendant had been arrested.
State v. Chrisman, 619 P.2d 971, 974 (Wash. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1992).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 4.
144. After confirming his suspicions, he obtained consent from the defendant
and his roommate to a search, which yielded additional controlled substances. Id.
145. Chrisman, 619 P.2d 971 at 975 (1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 1 (1992).
146. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 8.
147. Id. at 6-7.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Id. at 9.
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sen not to exercise it.150 Instead of immediately accompanying
the arrestee into the room, the officer exercised his right to
enter after he observed the marijuana seeds and the pipe. 15'
Although Chrisman permitted a plain view observation to
occur before the valid intrusion, it nonetheless remains consis-
tent with the theory of Coolidge. As in Coolidge, the view made
before entry did not authorize an intrusion. Intrusion was per-
mitted because the officer had a preexisting right to accompany
the arrestee in order to preserve the integrity of the arrest. 52
The seizure was thus justified only because it took place after
that right to intrude had attached. 53 The Coolidge Court dis-
tinguishes Chrisman from those cases where an officer happens
to pass an open doorway to a residence and observes what he
believes to be contraband inside the room. 54 In that situation,
inasmuch as the officer has no legal basis for making a warrant-
less entry, his open view would not provide him with an inde-
pendent right to intrude without a warrant. Chrisman, of
course, is different. There the officer had the authority to enter
not because of what he saw in the room but because the entry
was justified to preserve the integrity of the arrest. Thus even
had he seen nothing, his right of entry attached.
What emerges from this background is that, except for the
unique situation presented in Chrisman, the view of contraband
or incriminating evidence from outside a constitutionally-pro-
tected area does not legitimize a warrantless entry. Appellate
courts in some jurisdictions so specifically have held. For in-
stance, in Maryland, some three decades ago, its intermediate
appellate court dealt at length with this issue.155 There, police,
while investigating a breaking and entering, identified Willie
Lee Brown as a suspect. 56  Despite the fact that he had re-
fused to allow a search of his room or belongings, the police pro-
ceeded to the rooming house in which he resided.15 7 The police
150. Id. at 8-9.
151. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 8-9.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 8-9.
154. Id. at 9 n.5. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-89 (1980);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
155. Brown v. State, 292 A.2d 762 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
156. Id. at 777.
157. Id.
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team was invited in by the owner, who led them through a front
room and narrow hallway. 158 While walking down the hallway,
the owner indicated that one of the rooms with an open door
was the one occupied by Mr. Brown.159 From the hallway, they
were able to see clearly a cardboard box which appeared to con-
tain several items very similar to the ones that had been taken
in the burglary under investigation. Without actually entering
the room, a Deputy Sheriff reached in, pulled the bag into the
hallway and confirmed their suspicion. 160
Defendant argued that those items should not be admissi-
ble because their warrantless seizure was invalid.' 6 ' The trial
judge, however, ruled that since the police had probable cause
to believe that what they had seen plainly inside the room were
stolen goods, they had a right to enter and seize them under the
plain view doctrine. 62 The appellate panel disagreed. 63 It ex-
plained that the police had no separate or independent justifica-
tion for entering Mr. Brown's protected area of privacy. 64
Inasmuch, therefore, as the doctrine serves only to supplement
a prior justification, but is not, in and of itself, an exception to
the warrant requirement, what they observed in the room must
be characterized as open view that could not justify an
intrusion.16 5
c. State v. Griffin
Some ten years later, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
State v. Griffin16 6 likewise made a logical, well-documented
analysis of the significant difference between open and plain
view. The case, decided before both Hicks and Horton, is clearly
consistent with the rationale of both Coolidge and Chrisman.
In Griffin, while waiting to catch a bus, a sixty-year-old woman
was attacked by a young man who hit her in the face, grabbed
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Brown, 292 A.2d at 777.
161. Id. at 776.
162. Id. at 777-78.
163. Id. at 779.
164. Id. at 778.
165. Brown, 292 A.2d at 778-79.
166. 336 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1983).
2002] 329
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
her purse and fled. 167 Police called to the scene followed the rob-
ber's tracks in freshly fallen snow to a nearby rooming house.168
The landlady, who answered the door, told police she had a
roomer named Griffin who fit the description given by the vic-
tim. 169 Police knocked on the rear door of the house where the
footprints led, and the defendant answered the door. When
questioned on his whereabouts the defendant stated that he
had been in all evening. 170 The victim was brought to the back
door and immediately identified her assailant. After arresting
the defendant in the hallway, the officers gave him the Miranda
warning and asked him which room was his.17' At trial one of-
ficer testified that the purpose of asking the defendant to iden-
tify his room was to allow them to gather up his shoes and a
jacket so they could take him to the station. This same officer
stated that before he entered the room he saw a brown coin
purse on the bed, and he knew that the victim was missing such
a coin purse, among other items. The officer also testified that
after he entered the room he noticed that there was a lady's
purse on the floor of an open closet and that the purse was open
and appeared to have been "gone through."1 72 In addition, he
saw a jacket and dark-colored stocking cap, both of which were
wet. Upon checking the shoes of the defendant, they were found
to match the footprints in the snow that led the police to the
rooming house. 173 A second officer offered somewhat different
testimony. This officer stated that after he saw the coin purse
and jacket he then walked into the room to examine them, and
that the decision to get the shoes and the coat was probably
made after they had already entered the room and before they
took the defendant out of the house. 74
The defendant argued that the purse, coin purse, cap,
jacket and shoes should all be suppressed on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds. 175 The issue for the court was whether the police
167. Id. at 521.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d at 521.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 522.
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had a valid reason for crossing the threshold of the defendant's
room without a warrant after validly arresting him in the com-
mon hallway of the building. 76 The court held that the seizure
of the items was valid because at some point in time, the police
would have had to enter the room to get the defendant's shoes
and coat and at that time they would have seen the items in
plain view and the seizure would have been justified.177 Thus,
the seizure was made after the police officers had the authority
to make a valid intrusion.178
d. Other courts
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Idaho in State v.
Clark, 79 without as much discussion, articulated the theoreti-
cal and practical distinctions between open and plain view. 80
In other jurisdictions the decisions are less than consistent. An
analysis of selected cases in New Jersey and Pennsylvania dem-
onstrates such inconsistencies. Several years ago, an appellate
panel in New Jersey was presented with a legal issue which
should have been easily and readily resolved.' 8 ' Instead, it pro-
duced judicial controversy and what appears to be an incorrect
majority opinion. In Ford, officers from the Camden Police De-
176. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d at 523.
177. Id. at 524.
178. Id.
179. 859 P.2d 344 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
180. Police officers there were dispatched to answer a complaint about a loud
party possibly involving drugs and alcohol. Upon reaching the residence, one of-
ficer looked into the window and witnessed some of the occupants with drug para-
phernalia on a table in plain view. Id. at 346. The officer also overheard one of the
occupants state, "That's good speed," or words to that effect. The officer then made
his way to the front door from which he could see the same table with the drug
paraphernalia he had earlier observed. Id. Defendants argued that when the of-
ficer looked through the window, his observation constituted an illegal search. Id.
at 347. The court in rejecting this argument stated that while the officer was pur-
suing a legitimate police purpose, i.e., investigating a complaint of an excessively
loud party, the officer's view through the corner window constituted a valid "open
view." As a result, the observation implicated no Fourth Amendment interests.
Id. at 348. In distinguishing between open and plain view, the court explained: "A
plain view analysis would be appropriate if the defendants were challenging the
validity of the seizure of evidence inside the residence without regard to Deputy
Soumas' view through the corner window." Id. at 349 n.4. Plain view would justify
the seizure if the police were permitted to enter the residence. However, the court
reasoned, had the officers not had permission to enter, the seizure would not have
been valid under the plain view doctrine for lack of a prior justified intrusion.
181. State v. Ford, 651 A.2d 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
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partment, while conducting an undercover drug stakeout, saw
the defendants selling drugs which had been stored in a hole at
the side of a private house. 8 2 The defendant, Ford, was ob-
served reaching inside the hole, pulling out a clear plastic bag,
removing a small item and replacing the bag in the hole. 8 3 The
police subsequently recovered the bag, which contained thirty-
seven clear plastic bags of suspected cocaine. 84 Although the
trial court suppressed that evidence, 8 5 the appellate court
found that it was admissible under the plain view doctrine. 8 6
The court reasoned that the police had sufficient probable cause
to believe that the large plastic bag stashed in the hole con-
tained contraband. 8 7 Nonetheless, since it was "lawfully ex-
posed to view of the law enforcement officers, the clear plastic
bag and its clearly bagged contents remained subject to the
plain view rationale." 88
To the contrary, the dissent held that the prior justified in-
trusion element remained unsatisfied. 8 9 As it explained, "there
is no question but that these observations would provide a law-
ful basis for obtaining a warrant."190 Nonetheless, the observa-
tions did not provide an independent justification to lawfully
access the area from which the contraband was seized. 191 In es-
sence what took place was clearly open view, as opposed to plain
view and therefore, should have been suppressed.
e. State v. Lewis
A valid application of the plain view doctrine, on the other
hand, may be found in State v. Lewis. 192 In Lewis, a police of-
ficer, based on information provided by a reliable informant,
went to the home of Lewis who was suspected of drug dealing. 193
182. Id. at 104-05.
183. Id. at 105.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Ford, 651 A.2d at 106.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 108-09.
190. Id. at 108 (Conley, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
191. Ford, 651 A.2d at 108.
192. 561 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1989).
193. Id. at 1155.
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The officer knocked on the door and Lewis answered. 194 Upon
seeing the uniformed officer in the hallway, Lewis attempted to
close the door, but was prevented from doing so when the officer
placed his foot in the door. 195 It was at that point where the
officer observed narcotics and other incriminating evidence. 196
All nefarious items were seized. 97 The legal issue troubling the
trial court, as well as the various levels of appellate tribunals,
was whether the plain view doctrine applied. 198 The answer to
this legal issue nonetheless hinged on whether or not a war-
rantless intrusion into the apartment was justified by the exi-
gency of the situation. 99 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey correctly stated that the plain view doctrine was
inapplicable because there was no prior justification for enter-
ing Lewis' apartment. 200 The court not only found that the exi-
gencies were insufficient to warrant their entry,201 but also
found that plain view alone is never enough to independently
justify such an entry.20 2 Although their observation from the
hallway was perfectly legitimate, given that it was made from a
public vantage point, nonetheless the doctrine did not apply.
f. State v. Boynton
Lewis was distinguished in a subsequent case, but the dis-
tinction is not a sound one. In State v. Boynton,20 3 the police
were looking for an individual for whom an arrest warrant had
been issued on a domestic violence matter.20 4 The person
sought was known to frequent a particular bar.205 After unsuc-
cessfully searching the bar, police entered the restroom to see if
the subject was located therein.20 6 Upon entering the restroom,
they saw Boynton and another individual involved in what ap-
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Lewis, 561 A.2d at 1156-57.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1156.
200. Id. at 1160.
201. Id.
202. Lewis, 561 A.2d at 1158.
203. 688 A.2d 145 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
204. Id. at 146.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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peared to be a narcotics transaction. 2 7 A bag held by Boynton
was eventually taken from him based on probable cause that it
contained narcotics.208 After lengthy discussion on the issue,
the court ultimately decided that since the common area of the
restroom was open to the public the defendant had no expecta-
tion of privacy therein and the police officer had a perfect right
to enter like any other member of the public.20 9 Inasmuch as
the officer occupied a public, as opposed to a constitutional van-
tage point, there was no constitutional intrusion and his obser-
vation was merely open view.210 Therefore, seizure of the bag
could not be validated under the plain view doctrine. Nonethe-
less, the New Jersey court reasoned that since the officer "was
rightfully present in the restroom,"211 he had a right to seize the
plastic bag under plain view.212
In support of his motion to suppress, Boynton had argued
that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable based on the
court's decision in Lewis.213 The court, however, explained that
Boynton's reliance on Lewis was misplaced.2 14 It reasoned that
the plain view exception did not apply in Lewis, "because the
officer was not lawfully in the viewing area."215 Here, unlike
Lewis, a private residence was not involved, but the officer was
rightfully present in the restroom as he had the same right to
enter and remain in the restroom as any other member of the
general public. 21 6 Those facts, however, do not really distin-
guish it from Lewis because the officer there was likewise right-
fully present in the hallway outside of Lewis' apartment. Being
in such location amounts only to open view. Thus, neither in
Boynton nor in Lewis was there plain as distinguished from
open view.
207. Id.
208. Boynton, 688 A.2d at 147.
209. Id. at 150-51.
210. Id. at 150.
211. Id. at 151.
212. Id.
213. Boynton, 688 A.2d at 151.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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g. State v. Sansotta
A similar error in the analysis of the plain view doctrine
may be found in State v. Sansotta,217 a case involving an en-
counter between a police officer and the defendant, a suspect in
causing the sudden illness of a young lady. As the defendant
was getting into the police car the officer on the scene noticed a
huge bulge underneath his shirt.218 Thus the officer patted him
down, confirmed that the item was not a weapon but was a clear
"Aquafina" water bottle half-full with a clear liquid.219 Sus-
pecting that the water bottle might have had some connection
to the sick woman, the officer seized it and eventually had it
analyzed at a state police laboratory.220 The results of the labo-
ratory test indicated that the clear liquid contained what is
commonly known as an illicit "date rape" substance. 221
The defendant, who was eventually convicted of possession
of that illegal substance, argued that the warrantless seizure of
the bottle was unlawful. 222 The State responded that there was
probable cause to believe that the bottle contained some unlaw-
ful drug, thereby making it seizable under the plain view doc-
trine.223 The court eventually agreed with the defendant that
there was insufficient probable cause. 224 What is troubling
about the decision is that even if there had been adequate prob-
able cause to believe that the colorless liquid contained some
illicit drug, plain view would still be unavailable because the
police observation was only open view and therefore would not
constitute a prior justified intrusion.
h. Pennsylvania cases
Decisions in Pennsylvania likewise reflect great confusion
and misunderstanding over the prior justification element. On
the one hand, it has been explained that plain view cases fall
217. 769 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
218. Id. at 1110.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. The substance was Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (GHB), a colorless liquid
soluble in water which may cause one to vomit, pass out or become comatose. Id.
at 1109.
222. Sansotta, 769 A.2d at 1110.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1111.
2002] 335
29
336 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:307
into two distinct categories. 225 The first line of cases involve
those situations where a view takes place after a legal intru-
sion.226 If the intrusion is under some justified exception to the
warrant requirement, items in plain view will be admissible.
227
In the second line of cases, "the view takes place before any in-
trusion into a constitutionally protected area."228 The observa-
tion in that second line of cases which, in effect amounts to open
view, does not justify a constitutional intrusion.229 While in the-
ory the distinction is sound, subsequent cases appear to blur the
two separate lines of cases. Two typical examples are Common-
wealth. v. Wells 230 and Commonwealth. v. Robinson.231 In Wells,
police officers, after making a valid automobile stop, observed,
on the driver's seat, a plastic supermarket bag filled with illicit
narcotics. 232 Similarly, in Robinson, the officers, after making a
valid automobile stop, were able to see a gun lying on the floor
beside the driver's seat.233 The court permitted seizure under
the plain view doctrine in both instances. These cases, how-
ever, fall within the second line of cases enumerated in Chiesa.
Hence, plain view of the incriminating items from the public
225. Commonwealth v. Chiesa, 478 A.2d 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 321 A.2d 902 (Pa. 1973) (Police
were given permission to enter a home where they observed a knife which eventu-
ally turned out to be the murder weapon. Seizure was deemed valid under the
plain view doctrine.); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 308 A.2d 85 (Pa. 1973) (Defen-
dant was lawfully arrested in his home and requested that he be allowed to dress
before being taken to the police station. When an officer accompanied defendant
into a bedroom, he observed blood stained clothing which was relevant to the mur-
der charge for which the defendant had been arrested.); Commonwealth v. Rota,
292 A.2d 496 (Pa. 1972) (during a legal arrest of defendant in his apartment, police
officer in a search incident to that arrest found an envelope in plain view on a
nearby table containing drugs).
228. Id. at 852; see e.g., United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (Coast
Guard patrol boat on the high seas approached a rum runner's launch to examine
her with a search light); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 263 A.2d 904 (Pa. 1970) (FBI
agents observed defendant involved in gambling activities through the window of
the printing shop that he operated); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 310 A.2d 323 (Pa.
1973) (police observed, with the aid of a flashlight, a revolver located in the defen-
dant's vehicle).
229. Id.
230. 657 A.2d 507 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
231. 600 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
232. Wells, 657 A.2d at 508.
233. Robinson, 600 A.2d at 958.
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vantage point could not justify the entries into the respective
vehicles.
i. Texas v. Brown
While the reasoning is flawed, the end result is valid under
Texas v. Brown.234 Brown involved a routine stop of an automo-
bile at a driver's license checkpoint. The officer shined his
flashlight into the car and saw the defendant holding an opaque
green party balloon knotted about one-half inch from the tip.235
After the defendant dropped the party balloon onto the seat, the
officer reached into the car, picked up the balloon, and noticed a
powdery substance within the tied off portion.236 Cognizant of
the fact that narcotics are frequently packaged in such balloons,
the officer examined the automobile's interior a little more
closely and observed plastic vials, loose white powder, and an
open bag of party balloons. 237 The suspect then was arrested. 238
Subsequent tests verified that the seized knotted balloons con-
tained heroin.239 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held
that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable because the in-
criminating nature of the balloons was not "immediately appar-
ent."240 The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,
finding that Texas had interpreted "immediately apparent" too
strictly.241
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, explained that
the prior justification requirement was satisfied because the of-
ficer's initial foray into the car was valid based on the "Carroll
automobile exception." 242 The automobile was lawfully stopped
for a traffic check, the balloon was in the officer's view, and the
officer had probable cause to believe that the car contained con-
traband. 243 Consequently, the officer's entry into the automo-
234. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
235. Id. at 733.
236. Id. at 733-34.
237. Id. at 734.
238. Id.
239. Brown, 460 U.S. at 735.
240. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981), rev'd, 460
U.S. 730 (1983).
241. Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42.
242. Id. at 741 n.6.
243. Id. at 742-43.
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bile was a valid intrusion.244 Justice Rehnquist explained that
although the officer in Brown did not have probable cause to
enter the car until after he saw the balloon, once he saw that
balloon he had the right to enter under the Carroll doctrine and
to then seize the balloon under the plain view seizure doc-
trine. 245 As in Chrisman, it was deemed a prior justified intru-
sion by virtue of the fact that the officer had developed a legal
right to enter the automobile, although he chose not to exercise
that authority.
j. Maryland cases
As noted earlier, Maryland cases decided soon after Coo-
lidge reflect a clear perception of prior justified principles. Un-
fortunately, more recent decisions, upon close analysis, appear
contrary to those guiding principles. While as a practical mat-
ter some of the results can conceivably be justified on other
grounds, the courts' plain view analyses may be incorrect.
(i) Riddick v. State
In Riddick v. State,246 the defendant Quincy Riddick, also
known as Quincy Latimer, disembarked one afternoon from a
Metroliner at Penn Station that he had boarded in New York
City. He was accosted by several Baltimore City detectives, re-
sulting eventually in his arrest and conviction of narcotics of-
fenses. 247 It appears that in the hopes of interdicting drug
traffic emanating from New York, police officers were routinely
assigned to Penn Station for the purposes of questioning suspi-
cious individuals. Riddick was singled out because, in the police
officers' recollection, he was nervous as he was walking, contin-
ually looking around the station, preceding at a very fast pace,
and because of the luggage that he was carrying (a duffle bag
slung from his shoulder).248 After identifying themselves and
displaying their badges, the officers explained that they were
associated with Baltimore Drug Enforcement, and that they
244. Id. at 743-44.
245. Id. at 744.
246. 571 A.2d 1239 (Md. 1990).
247. Id. at 1240.
248. Id. at 1241.
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wished to speak with him.249 During routine questioning, re-
garding where he was coming from and how long he was going
to be in the area, Riddick continued acting nervously, shaking,
looking and moving around.250 At this point, Riddick agreed to
accompany the officers into a place that was more private than
the middle of the train station lobby. 251
The police brought Riddick to an area known as the inter-
view room. It was described as an Amtrak office, generally
closed to the public, about twenty-five feet by fifteen feet.252
The room was well lit by a fluorescent fixture and contained a
conference-type table as well as a telephone.253 Upon entering
the interview room, Riddick placed his duffle bag on the ta-
ble.254 One of the police officers asked him whether he "knew
about the drug problems" to which Riddick responded by open-
ing his bag, pulling out a sweatshirt and saying, "I don't have
anything."25 5 Peering inside the open bag, the questioning of-
ficer saw a quarter-gram silver measuring spoon with white
powder on it. From his training and experience, the police of-
ficer knew that it was common for those involved in drugs to use
spoons 256 instead of scales because it was less time consum-
ing.257 Within the next several seconds, the police officer
reached into the bag, removed the spoon, and examined it more
closely. 258 Convinced that the whitish powder was drug residue,
Riddick was placed under arrest. 259 Almost simultaneously, a
second police officer noticed an unusual bulge in Riddick's
pants.260 Unconvinced by Riddick's explanation for the bulge,
which felt soft and cylindrical, he reached into Riddick's pants
and removed plastic ziplock bags. 261 The bags contained a white
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Riddick, 571 A.2d at 1241.
252. Id. at 1247.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1247.
256. "The spoon is used to measure the quantity of the narcotic to place in a
bag for sale." Riddick, 571 A.2d at 247.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1247-49.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1249.
261. Riddick, 571 A.2d at 1249.
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powder, which upon subsequent chemical analysis, turned out
to be heroin. 26 2 Despite defense objections, the drugs and drug
paraphernalia subsequently were admitted at Riddick's crimi-
nal trial and served as a basis for his convictions. 263
On appeal, the court divided the foregoing narrative into
three distinct legal phases: the accosting, the retreat into an in-
terview room, and the events in the interview room.264 The trial
judge held that the accosting of Riddick in no way violated his
constitutional rights and, somewhat reluctantly, found that
Riddick validly consented to accompany the police into the in-
terview room.266 The court of appeals, on the other hand, re-
mained unconvinced that these two phases, the accosting and
the retreat into an interview room, did not present significant
constitutional difficulties. 266 Nonetheless, it assumed, argu-
endo, that the accosting of Riddick was reasonable and that he
voluntarily accompanied the officers into the more private in-
terview room. 267 It disagreed, however, with the trial court's
conclusion that the seizure of both the measuring spoon and the
heroin was legal. 268
Focusing on the events that transpired within the inter-
view room, the trial judge made two key findings of fact. Ini-
tially, the judge found that "the opening of the bag and exposing
its contents was a scheme thoughtfully and knowingly carried
out by the exercise of Riddick's free will, unfettered by coercion
in any way."26 9 That consent was limited in nature in that
while it allowed the officers to peer into the bag's interior, it did
not include consent for a physical invasion into the bag.270
Based on the relevant testimony, the lower court likewise con-
cluded that the mere presence of the spoon was insufficient to
give the officer probable cause to believe that Riddick was en-
gaged in the illegal drug trade.271 It was only after the spoon
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1242-44.
265. Id. at 1244.
266. Riddick, 571 A.2d at 1244.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1251.
269. Id. at 1250.
270. Id. at 1250.
271. Riddick, 571 A.2d at 1250.
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was removed from the bag's interior and examined closely, that
it became readily apparent to the police officer that the residue
was from a dangerous controlled substance.27 2 In the lower
court's opinion, those facts satisfied the requisite elements of
the plain view exception, justifying the arrest of Riddick, and
the seizure of the dangerous controlled substances. 273 While the
court of appeals acquiesced in the trial judge's factual findings,
it rejected the legal reasoning, and concluded that the plain
view doctrine was inapplicable in this case. 274
Distilling the discussions in a myriad of Supreme Court de-
cisions, the court listed what were then the three requirements
for a plain view seizure. They are described as follows:
(1) The police officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a par-
ticular area. (2) The officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently, which is to say, he may not know in advance the
location of certain evidence or contraband and intend to seize it,
relying on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext. (3) It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure. 275
With respect to the third element, the court explained that
the phrase "immediately apparent" has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to mean that the intruding officer must have at
least probable cause to believe that the item he seeks to see is
associated with some criminal conduct.276 That had long been
the position of Maryland's appellate courts.277
Analyzing the sequence of events in the interview room in
light of this background, the court concluded that the first two
requirements were clearly satisfied.278 Inasmuch as the trial
judge had concluded that Riddick knowingly and voluntarily ex-
posed the interior of his bag to the officers present, the "initial
intrusion" of the viewing officer "namely his merely looking into
272. Id. at 1250-51.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1251.
275. Id. at 1245 (citations omitted). Under Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
(1990) inadvertency is no longer a requisite element.
276. Riddick, 571 A.2d at 1245-46.
277. Id. at 1245.
278. Id. at 1250.
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the open bag, was lawful."279 In addition, the incriminating sil-
ver spoon was discovered inadvertently inasmuch as the officer
"did not know in advance that the spoon was in the bag and did
not intend to seize it, using the 'plain view' doctrine only as a
pretext."280 Thus, with respect to these two elements, the appel-
late court agreed with the trial judge.
However, the appellate court concluded that the third re-
quirement had not been met.281 The court found that the officer
peering into Riddick's bag had only a "mere suspicion" that the
spoon constituted evidence of some crime. 28 2 The police officer
developed the requisite probable cause only after removing the
spoon and examining it more closely. 283 Consequently, the plain
view exception could not justify the interference with Riddick's
possession, namely the spoon, because prior to that seizure the
officer had only a mere suspicion, and not probable cause that
Riddick's bag contained an illegal substance.
Apparently, if the peering officer had probable cause prior
to the physical intrusion into Riddick's bag, the court would
have condoned the seizure. That result, however, is untenable.
Riddick enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
tents of his belongings. While the opening of the bag, and its
exposure to public scrutiny, allowed for a visual examination of
its interior and contents, it in no way constituted an invitation
to rummage about in the interior. Thus, even with adequate
probable cause on the part of the peering officer, there would be
no legal justification for physically intruding into Riddick's
sphere of privacy. Where a police officer, from a public vantage
point, sees incriminating evidence in a private environment ex-
posed to public scrutiny, that view, in and of itself, does not al-
low, absent exigent circumstances, a physical intrusion into the
private sphere of privacy. Similarly, the police officer's observa-
tion of what would constitute incriminating evidence would not
justify a warrantless entry.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals of Maryland
were nevertheless of the opinion that a view from a public van-
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1251.
281. Riddick, 571 A.2d at 1251.
282. Id. at 1250-51.
283. Id. at 1250.
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tage point would satisfy the initial intrusion element contem-
plated by the plain view doctrine. Thus, the appellate court
determined that this element is satisfied when the police officer
makes either "an initial intrusion" or he is "in a position from
which he can view a particular area."28 4 The view of the police
officer may be perfectly legitimate, but it does not concomi-
tantly trigger the plain view exception for there has been no
lawful constitutional intrusion.
The court then makes the identical error in its analysis of
the given facts. It reasoned that the prior justified intrusion
requirement was met by the officers "looking into the open
bag."285 Again, that observation was perfectly justified in light
of Riddick's specific consent. He did not, however, consent to a
physical intrusion. In effect, this court would allow what
amounts to open view to justify an intrusion into a constitution-
ally-protected area. That is not only incorrect but is likewise
contrary to earlier Maryland decisions on the subject.
(ii) Hippler v. State
A few months after Riddick the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, in Hippler v. State,28 6 may have misapplied the prior
justification element. A police officer encountered Hippler
while in the process of serving a search warrant for dangerous
controlled substances. 28 7 He was preparing to move temporarily
into a residence listed in the warrant and happened to be at the
time installing tile in the basement. 288 Entering the residence
the police officer detected the powerful odor of PCP,
phencyclidine. 2 9 Thus, when he entered the basement and ob-
served Hippler, he asked him to "take a prone position against
the wall."290 Hippler complied. 291 The officer immediately no-
ticed a red cap or top, which he believed to be that of either a
vanilla extract or food coloring bottle, protruding from the right
284. Id. at 1245.
285. Id. at 1250.
286. 574 A.2d 348 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
287. Id. at 349.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Hippler, 574 A.2d at 349.
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front pocket of Hippler's pants. 292 As soon as he saw the red
cap, the officer later testified, he was quite certain that it was
an extract bottle used to carry liquid PCP.293 Based on what he
saw and smelled he removed the bottle from Hippler's pocket,
believing that it in fact contained PCP.294 A subsequent analy-
sis confirmed his suspicion.295
In Hippler's trial on a controlled dangerous substance
charge, Hippler objected to the admission of the extract bottle,
claiming that its warrantless seizure was unconstitutional. A
three judge appellate panel rejected the argument, finding that
the plain view doctrine condoned the police action. 296 The issue
in the opinion was whether or not there was probable cause to
believe that the bottle in Hippler's pocket contained an illegal
substance. 297 The panel decided that the valid initial intrusion
requirement easily was met "since the officers had obtained a
warrant to enter the house."298 That reasoning is not sound.
With respect to incriminating items discovered in the residence,
the initial entry would constitute the requisite valid constitu-
tional intrusion. However, entry into the premises alone would
in no way justify invasion of Hippler's person. What the police
officers saw in Hippler's pocket from their vantage point in the
residence was no more than open view and therefore would not
justify a search of Hippler's person.
On the other hand, while the court did not so specifically
reason, the facts may provide a basis for a valid plain view
seizure. If the scenario had been one where the police officer
had not yet made a valid constitutional intrusion, nor was he at
that time authorized to make such an entry, it would amount to
open view. However, what took place was that the officer either
was securing Hippler or already searching him when he came
upon the bottle of contraband. 299 It was not, therefore, the of-
ficer's observation which authorized the constitutional invasion.
292. Id.
293. Id. 349-50.
294. Id. at 350.
295. Id.
296. Hippler, 574 A.2d at 350-51.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 351.
299. Id. at 351-52.
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He already was engaged in a valid constitutional intrusion
when he made his observation. 300
VI. Conclusion
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court of the United
States has rendered several major decisions bearing on the
plain view doctrine. 301 Much earlier uncertainty has been clari-
fied. Plain feel, a concept closely akin to plain view now has
been recognized. 30 2 What remains problematic are applications
of Supreme Court decisions. The probable cause element with
respect to both plain view and plain feel is often applied incon-
sistently. The most elusive, and oftentimes misunderstood, ele-
ment is prior justification. It is the hope of this author that this
piece will provide clarification and guidance when navigating
this sometimes murky area of the law.
300. There may be a second justification for the result in Hippler. As a gen-
eral proposition where police have probable cause to effect an arrest, they may
conduct a search of the arrestee even prior to the formal arrest. Rawlings v. Ken-
tucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1980). Hence, based on the police observation there
was probable cause to believe that Hippler was in possession of contraband. That
probable cause gave them authority to arrest Hippler. Had the police made the
arrest, the search incident thereto would have been valid. Given that satisfactory
probable cause, they likewise were permitted to search moments before the actual
arrest - making introduction of that contraband permissible.
301. See e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (clarifying the "immedi-
ately apparent" standard as meaning probable cause on the part of law enforce-
ment authorities that the item revealed is in some way incriminating); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 146 (1990) (the plain view doctrine does not require that
the find be inadvertent); see also supra notes 4-32, 111-29 and accompanying text.
302. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993); see also supra notes 63-88
and accompanying text.
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